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COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON LAWYER 
REGULATION:  AN AGENDA FOR REFORM 
IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 
Deborah L. Rhode* & Alice Woolley**
 
 
Regulation shapes every area of modern economic life.  Getting 
regulation right—knowing when it is necessary, what it should accomplish, 
and what form it should take—is a critical part of policymaking in every 
society.  Developing an effective oversight structure requires a complex 
analysis of each society’s particular historical, cultural, and legal 
foundations.  Regulation of the practice of law is no different, although it 
has received surprisingly little public attention in the United States and 
Canada.  That is not for lack of problems, and other countries with similar 
legal systems, such as Australia and England and Wales, have begun to do 
better at addressing common oversight failures.  This Article explores why 
problems in American and Canadian legal regulation persist, and identifies 
reform strategies that build on recent innovations from abroad. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Although similar in many ways, the United States and Canada have 
constitutional and cultural differences that affect lawyer regulation.  In the 
United States, constitutional requirements of separation of powers have 
enabled state courts to assert inherent authority over professional 
regulation.  In Canada, the provincial legislatures have granted regulatory 
power to the law societies, which are governed by lawyers elected from the 
bar.  In theory, each structure has its strengths.  The American system 
protects the independence of the profession, and provides a somewhat more 
disinterested oversight body than one controlled directly by the bar.  The 
Canadian system offers greater potential for public accountability and 
checks on regulatory performance.  In practice, however, the oversight 
structures of both countries have similar weaknesses.  The profession in 
both the United States and Canada determines the focus of regulatory 
activities, and too often the emphasis is on protecting its own economic and 
reputational interests.  Frequently, the result is inadequate responsiveness to 
consumer concerns and unduly punitive sanctions for misconduct that 
occurs outside professional contexts but that threatens lawyers’ public 
image. 
In our view, the fundamental problem in both countries is structural.  No 
matter how well intentioned, no occupational group is situated to take a 
disinterested perspective on matters that implicate its own status and 
livelihood.  Nothing in the history of bar self-governance suggests that 
lawyers are an exception.  Recognition of this fact has led reformers in 
Australia and England to develop structures in which the profession shares 
authority with, and is accountable to, non-lawyer regulators.  These reforms 
are part of a broader trend to encourage greater accountability and 
transparency in regulatory structures that we believe should inform 
American and Canadian governance systems.1
Our proposals begin from two key premises about regulatory objectives.  
The first is that certain imperfections in the market for legal services justify 
external oversight.
 
2
 
 1. See Laurel S. Terry, Steve Mark, & Tahlia Gordon, Adopting Regulatory Objectives 
for the Legal Profession, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685 (2012).  As the OECD Report on Legal 
Services notes, there is a risk that self-regulation may promote the interests of the profession 
without yielding corresponding benefits to the public at large. OECD, COMPETITIVE 
RESTRICTIONS IN LEGAL PROFESSIONS 2007, at 19–20 (2008). 
  Such imperfections include what economists variously 
describe as:  information asymmetry and barriers; free riders; and 
externalities.  A second premise is that regulatory structures should focus 
on public protection rather than public image. 
 2. A perfectly functioning market has five features:  (1) numerous buyers and sellers,  
(2) homogeneous products that can be readily compared, (3) adequate information for buyers 
and sellers, (4) no barriers to entry and exit, and (5) no externalities.  As Alice Woolley has 
argued elsewhere, the legal services market has only one of these features—there are 
numerous buyers and sellers in the market. Alice Woolley, Imperfect Duty:  Lawyers’ 
Obligation to Foster Access to Justice, 45 ALTA. L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 107, 120–38 
(2008). See generally Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law:  How the Market for Lawyers 
Distorts the Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953 (2000). 
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Regulation fails when it does not effectively deter or remedy breaches of 
lawyers’ obligations to clients and to the legal system.  In the market for 
legal services, a common imperfection involves many consumers’ inability 
to make accurate assessments about the services they receive, either before 
or after purchase.  Most individual (as opposed to business) clients are one-
shot purchasers.  Their lack of experience, coupled with the expense and 
difficulties of comparative shopping for non-homogenous professional 
services, makes it hard for such consumers to identify cost-effective 
practices.3  Even sophisticated corporate clients may experience problems 
in assessing the necessity or efficiency of certain services and detecting 
fraudulent billing.4
Information barriers may adversely affect the quality or distort the 
pricing of professional services.  On the one hand, if clients cannot 
accurately discriminate among the services available, and no regulatory 
body enforces minimum standards, lawyers will lack adequate incentives to 
invest time, education, and resources in providing effective services.  
Competition may encourage attorneys to cut corners and a “market for 
lemons” may develop, in which bad lawyering drives out the good, and the 
public pays the price.  On the other hand, in the absence of adequate 
information, consumers may assume that status and price signify quality 
and will hire a more expensive lawyer than they require.  In the absence of 
some external regulation to ensure the cost effectiveness of legal services, 
too many purchasers may end up with incompetent, overpriced, or unethical 
practitioners. 
  Results are an inadequate gauge of professional 
performance because they may reflect factors beyond lawyers’ control, such 
as the fallibilities of judges or jurors, or the perversity of opposing parties. 
A further difficulty involves “free riders,” that is, those who gain from 
bar standards without personally observing them.  For example, the bar 
collectively has an interest in having lawyers conduct themselves in such a 
way as to maintain public trust.  Absent effective regulatory structures, 
however, individual attorneys will have inadequate economic incentives to 
avoid cheating; they can benefit as free riders from the bar’s general 
reputation without adhering to the rules that maintain it. 
A final category of market imperfections involves external costs to 
society and third parties from conduct that may be advantageous to 
particular clients and their lawyers.  For example, the public generally has 
an interest in seeing prompt and just resolution of disputes in circumstances 
where individual clients would be willing to pay lawyers to delay or 
obstruct truth-finding processes. 
 
 3. Legal services are non-homogeneous both because the needs of clients are not the 
same and also (and more importantly) because the services offered by one lawyer may vary 
radically from the services offered by another in terms of efficiency, diligence, skill, and 
legal knowledge. 
 4. In one survey of American lawyers, only 44 percent said they were never influenced 
by the temptation to do more work than the client needed, and 43 percent believed that at 
least 10 percent of work by American lawyers is unnecessary. William G. Ross, How 
Widespread Is Unethical Billing?, ACCT. & FIN. PLAN. FOR L. FIRMS, L.J. NEWSLETTERS, Oct. 
2007, at 2. 
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All of these problems call for regulation that makes protection of client 
and societal interests the paramount concern.  Imperfections in the market 
for legal services require oversight measures to ensure competent and 
ethical service to clients at a reasonable price.  The central challenge is to 
design regulatory processes that preserve professional independence but 
that also secure professional accountability where market mechanisms are 
unable to do so.  By this standard, both American and Canadian oversight 
structures fall short. 
I.  THE UNITED STATES DISCIPLINARY PROCESS 
The American disciplinary process has never lacked for critics.  Over the 
last four decades, both bar commissions and independent scholars have 
identified serious problems in responses to misconduct.  As Richard Abel 
summarized their consensus:  “[T]oo little unethical behavior is named, 
blamed, claimed, and punished.”5  Most Americans agree.  Only about a 
third of the public believes that the bar does a good job disciplining 
lawyers.6  “Too slow, too secret, too soft, and too self-regulated” has been a 
widespread complaint.7  Yet lawyers themselves tend to fault the system on 
precisely the opposite grounds.  Many see it as “unfair, oppressive, and 
counterproductive” for those subject to regulation.8
Both critiques have some basis in fact, although it is consumers who pay 
the greatest price.  The basic problem is structural.  As John Coffee puts it, 
self-regulation permits “the continued government of the guild, by the 
guild, and for the guild.”
 
9  What that has meant for bar discipline is too 
little focus on consumer protection and too much focus on lawyers’ 
reputational concerns.  Many disciplinary authorities do not even handle 
garden variety misconduct—“mere” negligence and overcharging—because 
of resource limitations and the (erroneous) assumption that other civil 
liability remedies are available.10
A.  The Flawed Structure of Professional Discipline 
  But virtually all authorities sanction 
misconduct committed outside of professional relationships in what is too 
often a misdirected effort to prevent discredit of the bar. 
The basic difficulty is that state supreme courts have claimed inherent 
authority to regulate the profession but have insufficient time, interest, or 
 
 5. RICHARD L. ABEL, LAWYERS IN THE DOCK:  LEARNING FROM ATTORNEY 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS 505 (2008).  For the ABA’s recommendations as to new model 
procedures for discipline at the state bar level, see ABA COMM’N ON EVALUATION OF 
DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES ix–xvii, 40–45 (1991). 
 6. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE 158 (2000); see also 
PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. JUSTICE SYSTEM 63 (ABA ed.,1999). 
 7. ABA COMM’N ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 5, at 
xxiv. 
 8. ABEL, supra note 5, at 505. 
 9. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper:  An Agenda for the SEC, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1316 (2003).  For similar views, see Anthony E. Davis, Professional 
Liability Insurers as Regulators of Law Practice, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 209, 231 (1996). 
 10. DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 983 (5th ed. 2009). 
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capacity to exercise that authority effectively.11  Most of these courts face 
crushing caseloads, and their justices have neither the resources nor the 
expertise to ensure adequate oversight.12  Nor do they have much 
inclination or incentive to challenge the organized bar on matters that hold 
great importance for lawyers but are not priorities for the general public.  
Judges share the background and world view of those they claim to 
regulate.  As social theorists note, a group’s distinctive norms, behaviors, 
and ways of thinking construct an institutional identity that shapes decision 
making.13  Moreover, most state judiciaries are elected and depend on 
lawyers for endorsements, rankings, and campaign contributions.14  Even in 
states where judges are selected through merit processes, state and local 
bars exercise substantial influence.15  The judiciary is also dependent on 
support from the organized bar concerning salaries and budgets, and is 
readily accessible to lawyer lobbying at conferences, annual meetings, and 
social gatherings.16
Part of the problem is the public’s lack of information and incentives to 
mobilize on the issue.  Few voters are aware of the judiciary’s role in 
regulating the profession, and no powerful groups have sought to make 
such issues relevant in judicial elections.
  By contrast, consumer interests rarely have such 
opportunities for influence. 
17  Help Abolish Legal Tyranny 
(HALT), the only national consumer organization that focuses on reforming 
the legal profession, has only about 20,000 members.18  Its resources and 
influence cannot compare to those of local and national bar associations that 
represent close to a million lawyers.19  Nor have consumer protection 
agencies been willing to intervene and even the playing field.20
 
 11. This argument draws on earlier work, including Deborah L. Rhode, Professional 
Regulation and Public Service:  An Unfinished Agenda, in THE PARADOX OF 
PROFESSIONALISM:  LAWYERS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 153, 161–68 (Scott L. 
Cummings ed., 2011); RHODE, supra note 
  A primary 
reason is that the individual clients and third parties most vulnerable to 
lawyers’ misconduct lack political leverage and incentives to demand 
6, at 158–65. 
 12. Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation:  Who Should 
Control Lawyer Regulation—Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167, 
1207 (2003). 
 13. BENJAMIN H. BARTON, THE LAWYER-JUDGE BIAS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 
133 (2011); Barton, supra note 12, at 1176; Benjamin H. Barton, Do Judges Systematically 
Favor the Interests of the Legal Profession?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 453, 456, 459 (2008) 
[hereinafter Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interests of the Legal Profession?]. 
 14. Barton, supra note 12, at 1187, 1195; Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the 
Interests of the Legal Profession?, supra note 13, at 458. 
 15. Kelly Armitage, Denial Ain’t Just a River in Egypt:  A Thorough Review of Judicial 
Elections, Merit Selection and the Role of State Judges in Society, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 625, 
656 (2002); Barton, supra note 12, at 1199. 
 16. BARTON, supra note 13, at 133; Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the 
Interests of the Legal Profession?, supra note 13, at 458; Barton, supra note 12, at 1200. 
 17. Barton, supra note 12, at 1203. 
 18. HALT, http://www.halt.org/about/about-halt/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 19. The American Bar Association alone has nearly 400,000 members. See Membership, 
ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/membership.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 20. Ted Schneyer, Thoughts on the Compatibility of Recent U.K. and Australian 
Reforms with U.S. Traditions in Regulating Law Practice, 2009 J. PROF. LAW. 13, 25. 
2766 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
reform.21  Most are “one shot” players who use lawyers infrequently and 
episodically.  In other regulatory contexts, the constituency that has been 
most effective in mobilizing consumers or representing their interests has 
been public interest lawyers.  But the success of their efforts often depends 
on financial support and pro bono contributions from the private bar.22  
Such assistance is hard to come by on issues that put the bar’s own interests 
at risk.23  The few sporadic efforts that have been made to create more 
publicly accountable disciplinary structures have proceeded with little 
consumer support and have folded in the face of opposition by the bar.24
As a consequence, courts have delegated day-to-day oversight authority 
to bar organizations or to commissions that are nominally independent but 
that are closely aligned with bar interests.  Lawyers can appeal disciplinary 
sanctions to the state supreme courts, but consumers have no effective 
recourse for decisions or processes that are unresponsive to their interests.  
Bar oversight processes are almost entirely reactive and generally respond 
only to complaints of serious professional misconduct or criminal 
convictions.
 
25  Although almost all jurisdictions have ethical rules requiring 
lawyers to report evidence of misconduct, these mandates are widely 
ignored and rarely enforced.  Only about 10 percent of the complaints to 
disciplinary bodies come from the profession.26  Yet despite lawyers’ 
notorious unwillingness to inform on colleagues, the most comprehensive 
survey found only four disciplinary actions over two decades for failure to 
report ethical violations.27
The resulting reliance on client grievances leads to under-inclusive 
remedies.  The system fails to respond when clients benefit from the 
misconduct, as in abusive litigation practices or complicity in fraud, or 
when victims lack information or incentives to file complaints.  
Sophisticated business clients generally find that withdrawal of business or 
non-payment of fees are more effective remedies than those available from 
the disciplinary system.  Even less powerful consumers who lack such 
options often doubt that bringing the matter to the bar will produce a 
satisfactory response.  They are generally correct.  The vast majority of 
grievances are dismissed without investigation because they fail to state a 
plausible claim within agency jurisdiction; for the remaining claims, 
 
 
 21. RICHARD ABEL, LAWYERS ON TRIAL:  UNDERSTANDING ETHICAL MISCONDUCT 476 
(2011); RHODE, supra note 6, at 7–8, 208. 
 22. See Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Law:  The Movement at Midlife, 60 STAN. L. 
REV. 2027, 2074–75 (2008). 
 23. The only public interest legal organization that has been significantly involved in 
reforming the legal profession is Public Citizen, and the resources it has been able to devote 
to the issue are extremely limited. Id. at 2040. 
 24. For discussion of efforts in California and Florida, see ABEL, supra note 21, and 
BARTON, supra note 13, at 139. 
 25. RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 10, at 982–83; Judith L. Maute, Bar Associations, Self-
Regulation, and Consumer Protection:  Whither Thou Goest?, 2008 J. PROF. LAW. 53, 61–
65. 
 26. ABEL, supra note 5, at 502. 
 27. See Lance J. Rogers, Misconduct:  Conference Panelists Call for Clarification of 
Obligation to Report Peer Misconduct, 23 LAW. MANUAL PROF. CONDUCT 297 (2007). 
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inadequate resources often limit the effectiveness of responses.28  Only 
about 3 percent of cases brought to disciplinary authorities result in public 
sanctions.29  Even where the bar finds significant misconduct, sanctions are 
often lax and clients are not guaranteed adequate compensation.30  For 
cases involving minor grievances of neglect, negligence, and fee disputes 
that authorities decline to handle, malpractice litigation is generally too 
expensive, and the lawyers most likely to be subject to complaints 
frequently lack civil liability insurance.31  Although a growing number of 
states have alternative dispute resolution systems for minor grievances and 
fee disputes, few of these programs are mandatory and not all are perceived 
as effective by clients.32  Many states also lack effective diversion systems 
or remedial approaches that respond to the causes of ethical violations.  
Attorneys too often receive reprimands rather than the training and 
oversight that will assist them in averting future problems.33
The problem is compounded by the absence of transparency.  Most 
ethical violations by lawyers or inadequacies in bar responses are not 
visible to the public.  Except in four states, bar disciplinary agencies will 
not disclose the existence of a complaint unless they have found a 
disciplinary violation or probable cause to believe that a violation has 
occurred.  Lawyers with as many as twenty complaints under investigation 
have received a clean bill of health when a consumer asked for information 
about their records, and it has sometimes taken as many as forty-four 
complaints over a decade to get a practitioner disbarred.
 
34
 
 28. See Michael S. Frisch, No Stone Left Unturned:  The Failure of Attorney Self-
Regulation in the District of Columbia, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 325 (2005); Maute, supra 
note 
  Even where 
25, at 62 n.39, 64–65. 
 29. See Mark J. Fucile, Law Firm Risk Management by the Numbers, 20 PROF. LAW., no. 
2, 2010, at 28.  
 30. See ABEL, supra note 5, at 500; Judith A. McMorrow et al., Judicial Attitudes 
Toward Confronting Attorney Misconduct:  A View from the Reported Decisions, 32 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1425, 1454 (2004).  Disciplinary bodies have lacked authority to impose 
fines or order damages, though they can condition decisions on restitution.  Where restitution 
is not ordered or the lawyer lacks sufficient assets, victims of intentional misconduct can 
seek compensation from client security funds, but they are insufficient to cover most claims. 
See Maute, supra note 25, at 65 & nn.43–44; ABA CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, 
STANDING COMM. ON CLIENT PROT., SURVEY OF LAWYERS’ FUNDS FOR CLIENT PROTECTION 
2005–2007, at 27 (2008) (reflecting that funds paid for about 10 percent of claims). 
 31. An estimated 20 to 50 percent of lawyers lack liability insurance. See RHODE & 
LUBAN, supra note 10, at 1016. 
 32. See Maute, supra note 25, at 62 n.38.  Only nine states have mandatory fee 
arbitration. See Fee Arbitration for Attorney Costs, LAWYERS.COM, http://alternative-dispute-
resolution.lawyers.com/arbitration/Fee-Arbitration-for-Attorney-Costs.html.  For discussion 
of disciplinary systems’ lack of attention to performance issues and the rates of client 
dissatisfaction, see RHODE, supra note 6, at 159, 181; Deborah Rosenthal, Every Lawyer’s 
Nightmare, CAL. LAW., Feb. 2002, at 23, 24.  In Oregon’s system, a majority of clients were 
not satisfied with the resolution of their complaints, although it is unclear how much of that 
dissatisfaction was related to unrealistic expectations. See generally OR. STATE BAR, 
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE OREGON STATE BAR CLIENT ASSISTANCE OFFICE (2006). 
 33. See Vivian Berger, Mediation:  An Alternative Means of Processing Attorney 
Disciplinary Complaints, 16 PROF. LAW. 21, 24 (2005). 
 34. See Leslie C. Levin, The Case for Less Secrecy in Lawyer Discipline, 20 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 1, 2 & nn.9–10 (2007); see also RHODE, supra note 6, at 160–61. 
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sanctions are imposed, the public lacks a ready way of discovering them.  
Not all states publish information concerning disciplinary sanctions, and 
many do not do so online or in forms that consumers can access.35
The profession and the public also lack information that would enable 
them to assess the adequacy of disciplinary processes.  Few states publish 
aggregate data concerning the nature of grievances, characteristics of 
attorneys, and sanctions imposed.
  Because 
the vast majority of complaints never result in public sanctions, and the vast 
majority of malpractice actions never result in published opinions, 
consumers often lack crucial knowledge about lawyers’ practice histories. 
36  The lack of transparency concerning 
the treatment of complaints, and the lack of proactive oversight of corporate 
lawyers whose clients seldom file grievances, feeds practitioners’ suspicion 
that the disciplinary system is biased against small firms, solo practitioners, 
and racial and ethnic minorities.37  The studies to date have not been 
adequate to evaluate those concerns.38  Nor do the twenty states that have 
diversion programs publish statistics on the effectiveness of these programs 
in preventing misconduct and addressing clients’ concerns.39
One consequence of the profession’s failure to develop adequate 
regulatory processes is that other decision makers have stepped into the 
breach and supplemented or supplanted bar oversight.  For example, 
lawyers’ complicity in some of the major financial scandals of the early 
twenty-first century led to no disciplinary actions but major new 
legislation.
 
40  Congress required, over the ABA’s vehement objections, that 
counsel in publicly traded companies make internal reports of potential 
fraud to corporate leadership.41  Other federal and state agencies have 
imposed ethical standards beyond what bar rules require, and prosecutors 
have brought criminal proceedings where disciplinary authorities have 
failed to act.42
 
 35. Levin, supra note 
  As John Leubsdorf summarizes the trend:  “[M]ore and 
34, at 20–21; Vesna Jaksic, Attorney Discipline Web Data 
Uneven, NAT’L L. J., Sept. 10, 2007, at 1, 7. 
 36. Lynn Mather, How and Why Do Lawyers Misbehave?, in THE PARADOX OF 
PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 11, at 130. 
 37. Id. at 111, 119.  For example, almost half of Oregon lawyers believe that the 
disciplinary system is biased, largely based on the size of the disciplined lawyer’s firm.  A 
majority of African-American lawyers in Illinois believe that race plays a factor in 
disciplinary decisions.  But only a small minority of white lawyers believe that race played a 
role in the disciplinary process. Levin, supra note 34, at 6–7. 
 38. Levin, supra note 34, at 7. 
 39. Id. at 4–6. 
 40. None of the lawyers involved in Enron faced bar sanctions. BARTON, supra note 13, 
at 253–54. 
 41. See Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton, Lawyers, Enron and Ethics, in ENRON:  
CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 625, 628 (Nancy Rappaport & Bala G. 
Dharan eds., 2004); Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1147, 
1170 & n.109 (2009). 
 42. Paul F. Rothstein, “Anything You Say May Be Used Against You”:  A Proposed 
Seminar on the Lawyer’s Duty to Warn of Confidentiality’s Limits in Today’s Post-Enron 
World, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1745, 1749 n.16 (2007) (noting the increased trend toward 
criminal prosecutions of lawyers in connection with clients’ crimes); Schneyer, supra note 
20, at 16–17 (noting the rise in regulation by Congress and federal agencies); Laurel S. 
Terry, The Future Regulation of the Legal Profession:  The Impact of Treating the Legal 
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more regulators have sought to regulate the bar . . . [and] have become 
increasingly unwilling to defer to either bar associations or courts.”43  
Clients and commercial organizations have also entered the arena.  Retainer 
agreements by large companies have included ethical mandates, insurance 
companies have insisted on additional ethics-related safeguards as a 
condition of malpractice coverage, and lawyer directories and websites have 
sometimes included information on disciplinary history and/or client 
reviews.44
Yet these initiatives have fallen short.  State courts’ assertion of inherent 
regulatory powers have limited the scope of comprehensive administrative 
and legislative intervention.
 
45  And insurance companies’ leverage has been 
limited by the unwillingness of all but one state bar to require that lawyers 
have malpractice coverage.46
B.  The Undisciplined Scope of Disciplinary Review:  
Non-professional Misconduct 
  Moreover, on some matters, such as the bar’s 
oversight of non-professional misconduct, there have been no external 
efforts to intervene, despite the inherent problems in current enforcement 
practices. 
Whatever its inadequacies in responding to misconduct that occurs within 
a lawyer-client relationship, the bar has often been highly vigilant in its 
responses to criminal offenses occurring outside it.  That should come as no 
surprise.  Such cases are relatively easy to pursue, because the hard 
investigative work has already been done by prosecutors, and the offenders 
are often highly unsympathetic to both the public and the profession.  
Virtually all states have a version of the ABA’s Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct that authorizes discipline for a criminal act that 
reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a 
lawyer, or for conduct that involves “dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation,” or is “prejudicial to the administration of justice.”47
 
Profession as “Service Providers,” 2008 J. PROF. LAW. 189 (describing entities regulating 
lawyers); Zacharias, supra note 
  
ABA standards identify eleven aggravating circumstances and sixteen 
41, at 1169–70 (discussing agency rules and criminal 
prosecutions). 
 43. John Leubsdorf, Legal Ethics Falls Apart, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 959, 961 (2009). 
 44. For client agreements, see Christopher J. Whelan & Neta Ziv, Privatizing 
Professionalism:  Client Control of Lawyers’ Ethics, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2577 (2012).  For 
insurance companies, see Anthony E. Davis, Professional Liability Insurers as Regulators of 
Law Practice, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 209 (1996).  For client reviews in Avvo, Martindale-
Hubbell, and the Association of Corporate Counsel, see ABEL, supra note 21, at 474–75. 
 45. See Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulation:  The Role of the 
Inherent Powers Doctrine, 12 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1, 6–13 (1990); see also supra 
notes 11–16 and accompanying text. 
 46. Only one state, Oregon, requires insurance, and only five others require disclosure to 
the client if the lawyer does not have coverage. Maute, supra note 25, at 71. 
 47. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(b)–(d) (2011). 
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mitigating circumstances that can be relevant in determining sanctions,48 
which permits widely varying responses to similar offenses across and even 
within jurisdictions.49
Part of the difficulty lies in the absence of evidence linking particular 
conduct to the justifications for bar discipline.  Courts have articulated two 
main rationales for professional oversight of non-professional offenses.  
One is protection of the public and the administration of justice from future 
violations of ethical standards.  The other is preserving popular confidence 
in the integrity of lawyers and the legal system.  In principle, both seem 
uncontroversial; in practice, both have proven highly problematic. 
 
The public protection rationale assumes that those who break rules in 
non-professional settings are also likely to do so in professional settings.  
Yet a vast array of psychological research makes clear that ethical decision 
making is highly situational, and depends on circumstantial pressures and 
constraints.50  Except in extreme cases, efforts to predict dishonesty, 
deviance, or other misconduct based on past acts are notoriously inaccurate, 
even by psychologists, psychiatrists, and other mental health experts.51
A case in point involves Laura Beth Lamb.  Trapped in an abusive 
marriage, Lamb lost her law license for ten years after taking the bar exam 
for her husband.
  
Untrained disciplinary officials and judges are unlikely to do better, 
particularly when the factors contributing to non-professional misconduct 
differ vastly from those encountered in lawyer-client relationships.  But 
many decision makers dismiss or discount the circumstances that 
distinguish personal from professional misconduct. 
52
 
 48. ABA, STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 26–28 (2005), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/regulation/standards_sanctions.a
uthcheckdam.pdf.   
  At the time of the exam, she was seven months pregnant 
and suffering complications from chronic diabetes.  Her husband, who had 
previously failed two exams, had bouts of rage and depression during which 
he threw heavy objects, and threatened to kill Lamb and her unborn child if 
she did not take the test in his place.  She agreed, disguised herself as her 
husband, and scored ninth out of some 7,000 applicants.  After an 
anonymous tip revealed the matter to the state bar, she pleaded guilty to 
felony impersonation and deception.  She received a $2,500 fine, probation, 
and a sentence of 200 hours of community service.  When she was fired 
from her job at the SEC, she took a position as a legal secretary.  She also 
 49. See infra notes 52–64 and accompanying text. 
 50. See generally JOHN M. DORIS, LACK OF CHARACTER (2002); PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE 
LUCIFER EFFECT:  UNDERSTANDING HOW GOOD PEOPLE TURN EVIL (2007); Gilbert Harman, 
Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology:  Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution 
Error, 99 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 315 (1999); Walter Mischel & Yuichi Shoda, A 
Cognitive-Affective System Theory of Personality:  Reconceptualizing Situations, 
Dispositions, Dynamics, and Invariance in Personality Structure, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 246 
(1995); Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 
491, 557–59 (1985); Alice Woolley, Tending the Bar:  The “Good Character” Requirement 
for Law Society Admission, 30 DALHOUSIE L.J. 27 (2007). 
 51. See Rhode, supra note 50, at 558–59 (citing sources). 
 52. In re Lamb, 776 P.2d 765 (Cal. 1989). 
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divorced her husband and received psychological treatment.  Despite her 
therapist’s conclusion that Lamb “was unlikely to ‘do anything remotely 
like this again,’” the California Supreme Court reasoned that her deceitful 
acts were of “exceptional gravity” and warranted disbarment.53  In the 
court’s view, the “legal, ethical, and moral pressures of daily practice come 
in many forms.  Besides raw avarice and self-aggrandizement, they may 
include the sincere but misguided desire to please a persuasive or 
overbearing client . . . .”54  Yet for the court to equate the pressure of an 
insistent client to that of an abusive, mentally unstable spouse suggests a 
profound insensitivity to the risks of battering a pregnant woman.55
In a recent Massachusetts case, another victim of domestic violence had 
her license suspended for conduct unlikely to recur in any professional 
setting.
 
56  Fawn Balliro, an assistant district attorney, was assaulted by a 
man in Tennessee with whom she was romantically involved.  A neighbor 
alerted the police, which led to misdemeanor assault charges.  The 
defendant pressured Balliro to drop the charges because he was on 
probation for drug offenses, and if he was convicted, he would be 
incarcerated and no one would be available to support his two minor 
daughters.  Balliro was unsuccessful in preventing the prosecution, and 
when called as a witness, testified falsely that her injuries occurred while 
falling.  The case was dismissed, and the Tennessee prosecutor informed 
the Massachusetts District Attorney’s Office that employed her of the 
suspected perjury.  The Office put Balliro on leave until she agreed to 
undergo counseling and report her conduct to disciplinary authorities.  She 
did so, and the bar recommended a public reprimand, partly on the basis of 
psychiatric testimony indicating that she was highly unlikely to commit 
such an act again.57  The Massachusetts Supreme Court, however, 
concluded that false testimony under oath could not be condoned, 
“irrespective of the circumstances,” and suspended her from practice for six 
months.58  In so ruling, the court noted the perceived inequity of giving her 
a greater penalty than the two-month suspension previously imposed on a 
lawyer who had assaulted his estranged wife.59
In most published decisions involving non-professional conduct, courts 
do not even bother to consider the likelihood of its replication in a 
professional relationship.  It is enough that the conduct threatens the 
  In the justices’ view, 
however, lying under oath was a more serious offense than battery, despite 
the mitigating circumstances. 
 
 53. Id. at 767–68. 
 54. Id. at 769. 
 55. See PAN-AM. HEALTH ORG., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE DURING PREGNANCY 1–2 (2000), 
available at http://www.planetwire.org/files.fcgi/2368_violencepregnancy.PDF; Loraine 
Bacchus et al., Domestic Violence:  Prevalence in Pregnant Women and Associations with 
Physical and Psychological Health, 113 EUR. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY & 
REPRODUCTIVE BIOLOGY 6, 6 (2004). 
 56. In re Balliro, 899 N.E.2d 794, 805 (Mass. 2009). 
 57. Id. at 796–98. 
 58. Id. at 804. 
 59. Id. at 804–05 (citing In re Grella, 777 N.E.2d 167 (Mass. 2002)). 
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reputation of the profession.  A representative example involves Albert 
Boudreau, a Louisiana lawyer convicted of importing several magazines, 
and a video, of child pornography.60  Boudreau purchased the items in the 
Netherlands, where the magazines were lawful and the models were of legal 
age to be photographed nude.  They were underage by American 
definitions, however.61  The Louisiana Supreme Court agreed with the 
disciplinary board that the actions constituted a “stain upon the legal 
profession,” and clearly reflected on the lawyer’s “moral fitness to practice 
law.”62  Despite the absence of any prior disciplinary record, or any 
relationship between personal and professional conduct, the court ordered 
disbarment.63
If the goal of such sanctions is to ensure public confidence, surely a 
better strategy would be to make the oversight process more responsive to 
professional misconduct, and less idiosyncratic in its responses to non-
professional offenses.  It can scarcely enhance respect for bar discipline 
when lawyers guilty of such offenses receive wildly different treatment, and 
the focus is professional reputation rather than public protection.  Sanctions 
for drug offenses, tax evasion, and domestic violence now range from 
reprimand to disbarment, and decision makers often disagree about the 
appropriate response in the same case.
 
64  As former Supreme Court Justice 
Robert H. Jackson noted in a related context, a standard like moral 
turpitude, which permits decisions to turn on reactions of “particular judges 
to particular offenses,” invites caprice and clichés.65
 
 60. In re Boudreau, 815 So. 2d 76, 76 (La. 2002). 
  Surely a profession 
concerned about the legitimacy of its own regulation should aspire to do 
better. 
 61. Id. at 78. 
 62. Id. at 78–79. 
 63. Id. at 79–80. 
 64. For drugs, see Florida Bar v. Liberman, 43 So. 3d 36, 37 (Fla. 2010) (disbarment for 
supplying friends with small amounts of methamphetamine and Ecstasy); In re Lewis, 651 
S.E.2d 729, 730 (Ga. 2007) (two-year suspension for possession of cocaine); In re Vegter, 
835 N.E.2d 494 (Ind. 2005) (public reprimand for marijuana possession); State ex rel. Okla. 
Bar Ass’n v. Smith, 246 P.3d 1090, 1095 (Okla. 2011) (public censure and one-year deferred 
suspension); Brian K. Pinaire et al., Barred from the Bar:  The Process, Politics, and Policy 
Implications of Discipline for Attorney Felony Offenders, 13 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 290, 
319 (2006).  For tax evasion, see Pinaire et al., supra, at 319; Tax Evasion Aggravated by 
High Lifestyle Nets Year-Long Suspension for Two Lawyers, 26 LAW. MANUAL PROF. 
CONDUCT 14 (2010).  For domestic violence, see Ignascio G. Camarena II, Comment, 
Domestically Violent Attorneys:  Resuscitating and Transforming a Dusty, Old Punitive 
Approach to Attorney Discipline into a Viable Prescription for Rehabilitation, 31 GOLDEN 
GATE U. L. REV. 155, 173 (2001).  For an illustration of disagreements on the same facts, see 
In re Lever, 869 N.Y.S.2d 523, 524, 528 (App. Div. 2008), which involved an associate who 
used his office computer to solicit sex by pretending to be a thirteen-year-old girl.  The 
referee recommended a six-month suspension; the court imposed a three-year suspension, 
and two judges voted to disbar him. 
 65. Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 239 (1951) (Jackson, J. dissenting). 
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II.  THE CANADIAN DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM 
A.  Overview and Critiques 
Provincial law societies regulate Canadian lawyers.  As independent 
administrative agencies exercising jurisdiction granted by statute, these 
societies determine the standards for admission and discipline, as well as 
investigate and sanction lawyer misconduct.66  Law societies also exercise 
various other regulatory powers, such as mandating continuing legal 
education, conducting practice audits, establishing trust accounting rules, 
and governing the insurance plans to which all Canadian lawyers must 
belong.  Somewhat unusually for a Canadian independent administrative 
agency, law societies also have rulemaking authority.67
The law societies’ governing statutes direct them to “uphold and protect 
the public interest in the administration of justice”; many also call on them 
to “uphold and protect the interests of [their] members.”
 
68  “Benchers” 
elected from members of the profession govern each law society, along with 
a small number of appointed “lay” benchers.69  Disciplinary decisions—
about whether misconduct has occurred and what should be the appropriate 
sanction—are made by a panel of benchers.  They are usually unpaid.70
In recent years, the law societies have increased their efforts to work 
together to adopt national strategies on questions of professional ethics and 
conduct.  The Federation of Law Societies (Federation), an informal 
umbrella organization with representatives from each law society, has 
undertaken initiatives to require accreditation of Canadian common-law law 
schools, to facilitate mobility of lawyers between the provinces, and to 
develop a national code of conduct.
 
71  Although the accreditation and 
national code initiatives are still ongoing, they seem likely to succeed in 
significant part.72
 
 66. See, e.g., Legal Profession Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. L-8 (Can.); Legal Profession Act, 
S.B.C. 1998, c. 9 (Can.); Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.8 (Can.); Professional Code, 
R.S.Q., c. C-26 (Can.). 
  Neither the law societies nor the Federation undertake 
lobbying or similar activities; representation and advocacy for the 
profession are matters for the Canadian Bar Association. 
 67. See Legal Profession Act, S.S. 1990, c. L-10.1, s. 10 (Can.); Legal Professions Act, 
S.N.S. 2004, c. 28, s. 5(8) (Can.). 
 68. See, e.g., Legal Profession Act, S.B.C. 1998, c. 9, s. 3 (Can.).  In British Columbia 
the power to act in the interests of the profession is subordinate to the public interest. Id.  
That is not the case in some of the other provinces.  For example, the Law Society of Alberta 
has the power to sanction any conduct that harms the reputation of the profession. See Legal 
Profession Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. L-8, s. 49 (Can.). 
 69. In Alberta, the power to appoint is vested in the Minister of Justice. See Legal 
Profession Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. L-8, s. 11 (Can.).  In Ontario, it is the Lieutenant-Governor 
in Council. Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L-8, s. 1 (Can.). 
 70. The exception to this is Ontario, where benchers are compensated in some 
circumstances. 
 71. See National Regulatory Initiatives, FED’N L. SOC’YS CAN., http://www.flsc.ca/en/
national-standards/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
 72. The accreditation program is relatively modest compared to the U.S. system, and 
many provinces are revising the code prior to adoption. 
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This structure gives the Canadian bar considerable autonomy; indeed, 
Canada may be the “last bastion of unfettered self-regulation of the legal 
profession in the common law world,” given that Australia, New Zealand, 
England and Wales, and other common law countries have significantly 
increased the role of non-lawyers in regulating the profession, and the 
United States has always involved state courts in the disciplinary process.73  
Canadian courts do exercise limited regulatory authority over lawyers 
through their inherent jurisdiction to control their own processes.  That 
authority includes imposing costs on lawyers personally for unethical 
conduct, establishing the law on conflicts and privilege, and otherwise 
controlling the conduct of litigation before the courts.74  This judicial 
authority is distinct, however, from the power of the law societies, and is 
subject to significant constraints.  Courts cannot suspend or disbar lawyers, 
cannot impose consequences for patterns of conduct, and cannot sanction 
conduct that occurs outside of the litigation context.75  Although other 
regulatory bodies—such as securities commissions—have the power to 
impose practice requirements, this authority as yet has had little substantive 
impact on Canadian lawyers’ ethical and legal obligations.76
Like their American counterparts, the Canadian law societies have been 
subject to significant criticism.  Harry Arthurs characterizes Canadian 
lawyer regulation as reflecting an “ethical economy,” in which law societies 
focus disciplinary attention on marginal members of the profession who 
have engaged in obviously immoral conduct or who have violated the 
regulatory requirements imposed by the law societies.  Arthurs suggests that 
law society discipline “reflects a tendency to allocate its scarce resources of 
staff time, public credibility and internal political consensus to those 
disciplinary problems whose resolution provides the highest returns to the 
profession with the least risk of adverse consequences.”
 
77
 
 73. See ALICE WOOLLEY, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS IN CANADA 4, 4–9 (2011). 
  High-reward 
discipline cases are those that enhance “public goodwill or professional 
 74. See, e.g., R. v. Neil, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 631 (Can.) (establishing a rule for duty of 
loyalty); Smith v. Jones, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 45 (Can.) (establishing a rule for solicitor-client 
privilege); Walsh v. 1124660 Ontario Ltd., [2002] O.J. No. 4069, 116 A.C.W.S. (3d) 755 
(Can. Ont. S.C.J.) (imposing costs of litigation on the defendant lawyer); MacIntyre v. 
Dickie, [1996] O.J. No. 1336 (Can. Ont. Gen. Div.) (imposing costs of discovery on the 
defendant lawyer); WOOLLEY, supra note 73, chs. 5, 8; Adam M. Dodek, The Public Safety 
Exception to Solicitor-Client Privilege:  Smith v. Jones, 34 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 293, 
293–94 (2001). 
 75. The exception is the taxation power—any lawyer account can be taxed, whether or 
not related to litigation. 
 76. See, e.g., Wilder v. Ontario Sec. Comm’n, [2001] O.J. No. 1017, 53 O.R. (3d) 519 
(Can. Ont. C.A.). 
 77. Harry W. Arthurs, Why Canadian Law Schools Do Not Teach Legal Ethics, in 
ETHICAL CHALLENGES TO LEGAL EDUCATION AND CONDUCT 105, 112 (Kim Economides et al. 
eds., 1998) [hereinafter Arthurs, Canadian Law Schools]; see also Harry W. Arthurs et al., 
Canadian Lawyers:  A Peculiar Professionalism, in 1 LAWYERS IN SOCIETY:  THE COMMON 
LAW WORLD 123–85 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 1988); H.W. Arthurs, The 
Dead Parrot:  Does Professional Self-Regulation Exhibit Vital Signs?, 33 ALTA. L. REV. 
800, 801–02 (1995). 
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solidarity”; high-risk discipline cases are those that diminish them.78  
Arthurs notes that most lawyers who get disbarred are guilty of 
misappropriation of client funds or other obvious wrongdoing, or have 
shown themselves unwilling to respect law society authority; very few 
lawyers are disciplined for incompetence or other more ambiguous types of 
professional misconduct.79  Further, disciplinary sanctions tend to 
disproportionately target lawyers in solo practice or small partnerships.  
This may be in part because those lawyers engage in higher risk types of 
practice (such as conveyancing) or lack “collegial supports and controls,” 
but also, more disturbingly, may be because they are at the margins of the 
profession in power and status.80  A review of law society decisions 
confirms Arthurs’s characterization.  In 2009, for example, most lawyers 
were sanctioned for obviously immoral conduct or for defying the 
regulatory authority of the law societies, and most lawyers brought before 
the law society practiced alone or in a firm of fewer than ten lawyers.81
Other critics of law societies identify a wide range of failures.  These 
include:  ineffective regulation of competence; lack of performance 
standards for lawyers undertaking particular tasks; lack of adequate (or any, 
in some jurisdictions) regulation of law firms; insufficient responses to 
unethical billing; inattention to inequities in access to justice; excessive 
concern with professional reputation; and mishandling of specific cases.
 
82
Our point . . . is not to immediately proclaim “regulatory failure” or 
suggest that self-regulation is irremediably unsalvageable.  Rather, 
our purpose is to indicate that the current Canadian complacency 
[about lawyer regulation] is unwarranted.  At every level of the 
regulatory regime—establishing standards, monitoring conduct, 
and enforcing penalties—there appears to be serious problems that 
  
After citing ten failures in law societies’ responses to issues such as 
disclosure of imminent financial harm, competence, sexual relations 
between lawyers and clients, continuing legal education, fees, pro bono, and 
self-regulation, Richard Devlin and Porter Heffernan noted: 
 
 78. Arthurs, Canadian Law Schools, supra note 77, at 112. 
 79. Id. at 113. 
 80. Id. at 115. 
 81. See Alice Woolley, Regulation in Practice, 15 LEGAL ETHICS (forthcoming 2012), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1976090. 
 82. Richard F. Devlin & Porter Heffernan, The End(s) of Self-Regulation?, 45 ALTA. L. 
REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 169 (2008); Adam M. Dodek, Regulating Large Law Firms 
(forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1984635; Gavin MacKenzie, Regulating Lawyer Competence and Quality of Service, 45 
ALTA. L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 143, 150 (2008); Michael Trebilcock, Regulating the Market 
for Legal Services, 45 ALTA. L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 215, 224 (2008); Alice Woolley, 
Ethics as Regulation:  A Comment on Merchant v. Law Society of Saskatchewan, 72 SASK. 
L. REV. 279, 290–92 (2009) [hereinafter Woolley, Ethics as Regulation]; Alice Woolley, 
Time for Change:  Unethical Hourly Billing in the Canadian Profession and What Should Be 
Done About It, 83 CAN. B. REV. 859, 860–61 (2004) [hereinafter Woolley, Time for 
Change]; Woolley, supra note 2, at 107–41. 
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require us to question whether self-regulation is truly in the public 
interest.83
B.  A Flawed Structure 
 
Many of the reasons for the limited effectiveness of Canadian regulatory 
processes match those identified in the American system.  The most 
significant barrier to effective bar oversight arises from the regulatory 
structure itself.  A province-based system has limited ability to access any 
economies of scale.  While the law society of Ontario can draw resources 
(financial and personnel) from some 30,000 members, the law society of 
Saskatchewan can draw from only 1,500; yet both law societies are 
expected to offer the full range of regulatory oversight, and to respond to all 
forms of lawyer misconduct.84  Even in the larger provinces of Ontario and 
Quebec, available resources may fall short of meeting regulatory needs.  
Law societies have the broad and complex task of formulating as well as 
enforcing regulatory policies.  Yet these societies depend on modest 
member dues to fund services, and on the (mostly volunteer) time of 
lawyers to implement their regulatory agenda.85
These problems are compounded by a highly autonomous regulatory 
structure.  It may well be that any lawyer regulatory structure will be 
vulnerable to capture by its subjects on at least some issues.
  No other area of complex 
economic activity in Canada relies so heavily on regulation through the 
volunteer efforts and financial support of the group being regulated.  It is 
scarcely surprising that the system falls short. 
86
As in the United States, consumers in Canada have not effectively 
organized to demand a more effective oversight process.  Despite the 
widespread criticism by experts, the public has voiced almost no 
comparable concerns.  Even events that seem most likely to attract negative 
publicity, such as exposure of a sexual relationship between the head of the 
Law Society of Upper Canada (Ontario) and a vulnerable client, or the 
conviction of the President of the Law Society of British Columbia on 
charges related to drunk driving, have attracted relatively little public 
  In the 
Canadian system, however, no capture is necessary.  Lawyers control every 
aspect of the governance process, and have the statutory authority to 
regulate in their own interests.  No countervailing forces have a meaningful 
voice.  No elaborate conspiracy theory is required to suggest that such a 
regulatory structure is likely to privilege professional over public interests, 
and to focus attention on contexts where those interests align:  clear moral 
misconduct by the least powerful members of the bar. 
 
 83. Devlin & Heffernan, supra note 82, at 182. 
 84. Saskatchewan had to address the best-known legal ethics scandals of the last fifteen 
years in Canada:  the solicitation of clients and fee abuses by Anthony Merchant in relation 
to the Indian residential schools litigation. Id. at 176–77. 
 85. As noted earlier, in most provinces benchers are not compensated; in Ontario, they 
are paid once their time commitment reaches a certain level. 
 86. Duncan Webb, Are Lawyers Regulatable?, 45 ALTA. L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 233, 
253 (2008). 
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attention and no suggestion that those events demonstrate regulatory 
failure.87
The lack of consumer engagement may have multiple causes, including 
the diffusion of regulation across the provinces; the absence of a prominent 
role for lawyers in Canadian history or public life; and the inaccessibility of 
information about lawyer misconduct and regulatory failures.  Most law 
society disciplinary decisions are publicly available through CanLII and in 
addition, each law society provides statistics in its annual report about the 
number of active and inactive lawyers in the province, the number of 
complaints, and the imposition of serious sanctions.
  Although no evidence indicates that the public’s view of lawyers 
is more positive in Canada than in other nations, any disenchantment with 
the profession has not led to activism or calls for change. 
88
In addition, the limited jurisdiction of the law societies leaves many 
aggrieved parties without an effective remedy.  Although the societies 
normally respond to disciplinary matters only when brought to their 
attention by complaints, generally from clients, these societies cannot 
provide meaningful compensation.
  No publicly 
available information is available, however, on complaints that do not result 
in sanctions, or about the number of complaints that have been made 
against a lawyer.  Although law societies issue ethics opinions to lawyers 
who request them, the rulings are not available to other practitioners in any 
readily accessible form. 
89
 
 87. Law Soc’y of Upper Can. v. Hunter, 2007 ONLSHP 27 (CanLII); Law Soc’y of B.C. 
v. Berge, 2005 L.S.B.C. 28 (CanLII). 
  The absence of such remedies 
diminishes parties’ incentives to complain and, in turn, also diminishes the 
profession’s opportunities to respond.  A further problem is the failure of 
Canadian academics and law schools to make lawyers’ ethical and 
regulatory responsibilities a primary area of concern.  In many Canadian 
law schools, legal ethics has not been a required course.  Despite recent 
improvements, only a handful of Canadian legal academics work primarily 
in the area of legal ethics, and only slightly more have written about the 
 88. See CANLII, http://www.canlii.org; see also, e.g., LAW SOC’Y OF ALTA., ANNUAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT (2009), available at http://www.lawsociety.ab.ca/files/financial/
Annual_Report_2009.pdf. 
 89. On occasion, law societies discover financial misconduct through the audit process.  
In addition, the Law Society of Upper Canada has introduced a process for judges to make 
complaints about lawyers that will result in mentoring rather than disciplinary proceedings.  
This process is designed to ensure that judges are not deterred from reporting lawyers 
because of concerns that the sanctions may be too severe. See Letter from Malcolm L. Heins, 
CEO, Law Soc’y of Upper Can., to the Honourable Madam Justice Heather Forster Smith, 
Chief Justice of the Superior Court of Justice (Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.lsuc.on.ca/media/
mar3110_scj_protocol.pdf.  As in the United States, lawyers have an ethical obligation to 
report misconduct by other lawyers, but this obligation is generally not fulfilled, and lawyers 
who do complain about other counsel may be perceived as doing so for strategic or tactical 
reasons.  The Law Society of Upper Canada has some ability to order lawyers to repay fees 
to a client or contribute to a general compensation fund. See Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1990, 
c. L.8, parts 13 & 14 (Can.).  Some law societies will undertake fee arbitration between 
lawyers and clients. See, e.g., LAW SOC’Y OF MAN., CONCERNS ABOUT YOUR LAWYER, 
http://www.lawsociety.mb.ca/for-the-public/concerns-about-your-lawyer#fees (last visited 
Apr. 21, 2012). 
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subject at all.90
This is not to impugn the good faith efforts by law societies to live up to 
their regulatory responsibilities.  But it is to underscore the structural and 
resource limitations that keep those efforts focused on egregious or readily 
proved misconduct, and that leave many problems unaddressed.  
Competence, counseling, fees, litigation conduct, and lawyering in large 
firms frequently fall outside law society oversight. 
  This absence of scholarly interest restricts the information 
available to the public concerning problems in oversight processes. 
C.  Regulation of Character 
Although a great deal of lawyers’ professional conduct remains insulated 
from regulatory attention, their personal behavior is a common focus of bar 
discipline.  Law societies do not hesitate to sanction lawyers convicted of 
crimes unrelated to legal practice, even where there is no reason to believe 
that the lawyer has engaged in professional misconduct or is at risk of doing 
so. 
As in the United States, this willingness may be partly attributable to the 
lack of evidentiary problems and to the morally distasteful nature of the 
lawyer’s misconduct.91  And, as noted earlier, many law societies have 
express authority to regulate in the interests of the profession, which 
includes maintaining lawyers’ reputations in the eye of the public.92
In one recent example, the Law Society of Upper Canada (Ontario) 
considered the conduct of a nationally prominent energy lawyer who was 
convicted of sexual exploitation of two girls between the ages of fifteen and 
eighteen.  The lawyer was a friend of the girls’ family, the relationships 
were consensual, and the girls retained a positive attitude toward the 
 
 
 90. See, e.g., Adam M. Dodek, Canadian Legal Ethics:  A Subject in Search of 
Scholarship, 50 U. TORONTO L.J. 115 (2000).  For improvements, see Adam M. Dodek, 
Canadian Legal Ethics:  Ready for the Twenty-First Century at Last, 46 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 
1 (2008).  More scholars teach in the area than write in it.  With the Federation of Law 
Societies’s new requirement that every common-law law school teach legal ethics, it may be 
that—as happened following the ABA’s requirement of a mandatory law school course—
legal ethics will become a more active area of legal scholarship. 
 91. The criminal conviction proves the case, and the lawyer has no right to re-argue it in 
a different setting. Toronto v. Canadian Union of Pub. Emps., Local 79, [2003] S.C.R. 77 
(Can.). 
 92. See, e.g., Legal Professions Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. L-8, s. 49(1) (Can.) (defining the 
power of the Law Society to discipline matters whether or not occurring within the lawyer’s 
practice, and either in the best interests of the public or of the profession).  In Ontario, Rule 
1.02 of the Rules of Professional Conduct defines “conduct unbecoming” as conduct “in a 
lawyer’s personal or private capacity, that tends to bring discredit upon the legal profession.” 
LAW SOC’Y OF UPPER CAN., RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1 (2000).  For examples of reliance 
on protecting the profession’s reputation, see Law Soc’y of Man. v. Dolovich, 2010 MBLS 
11 (CanLII); Law Soc’y of Upper Can. v. Horgan, [2010] L.S.D.D. No. 14, paras. 14–15 
(Can.); Law Soc’y of B.C. v. Berge, 2005 LSBC 28, paras. 83–87 (CanLII); Law Soc’y of 
B.C. v. Rodgers, 2005 LSBC 42, para. 9 (CanLII); Law Soc’y of Upper Can. v. Mills, 2005 
ONLSHP 5, para. 30 (CanLII); Law Soc’y of Upper Can. v. Johnston, [2003] L.S.D.D. No. 
21, para. 37 (Can.); Law Soc’y of Man. v. Bjornson, [1996] L.S.D.D. No. 258 (Can.); Law 
Soc’y of Upper Can. v. Morra, [1995] L.S.D.D. No. 171, para. 26 (Can.). 
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lawyer, even after his criminal conviction.93  According to the trial judge, 
they were not “‘true victims’ in the ordinary sense of the word” and were 
“not seriously negatively impacted by their overall relationship with the 
accused.”94  The trial judge nonetheless sentenced the lawyer to a brief 
period of incarceration based on his breach of trust.  In disciplinary 
proceedings, an expert testified that the lawyer was extremely unlikely to 
re-offend; there was no evidence to suggest misconduct in the lawyer’s 
professional life.95
The issue of general deterrence is an important factor by itself, but it also 
has a connection to the maintenance of the standing and integrity of 
lawyers before the public. . . .  In our view, general deterrence of lawyers 
from engaging in exploitative sexual behaviour, and maintaining the 
public’s confidence in the status of lawyers and their entitlement to 
practise as a self-regulating profession, are two sides of the same coin.
  One of the girls wrote a letter expressing her support 
and sympathy for the lawyer.  Nonetheless, the Law Society revoked his 
license to practice based on the seriousness of his breach of trust, the need 
to deter similar conduct, and the importance of ensuring public confidence 
in the legal profession.  The Society stated: 
96
Yet for reasons noted earlier, the normative and empirical foundations for 
this focus on reputational concerns are weak.
 
97  No evidence suggests that 
sanctioning non-professional conduct is an effective way of promoting 
public confidence.  More attention to lawyers’ misconduct in professional 
settings might better safeguard the image of attorneys and the credibility of 
regulatory processes.  A more defensible justification for sanctions based on 
lawyers’ personal conduct is that personal misconduct is predictive of 
future professional conduct.  This rationale is most plausible when the 
actions closely relate to the lawyer’s legal practice, or arise from 
opportunities afforded by the lawyer’s practice.98  But in many contexts, 
such as the one reflected in Law Society of Upper Canada v. Budd, the 
relationship is highly attenuated, and the empirical evidence summarized 
earlier underscores the impossibility of accurately predicting future moral 
behavior based on conduct occurring in different factual circumstances.99
 
 93. Law Soc’y of Upper Can. v. Budd, [2009] L.S.D.D. No. 141, para. 6 (Can.). 
  
Law societies generally take no account of such evidence, and expect that 
the public will assume a connection between personal and professional 
conduct. 
 94. Id. at paras. 16–17. 
 95. Id. at para. 58. 
 96. Id. at paras. 86–87. 
 97. See generally Alice Woolley, Legal Ethics and Regulatory Legitimacy:  Regulating 
Lawyers for Personal Misconduct, in ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON LAWYERS AND LEGAL 
ETHICS:  REIMAGINING THE PROFESSION 241 (Francesca Bartlett et al. eds., 2011). 
 98. In Law Society of Upper Canada v. Johnston, [2003] L.S.D.D. No. 21 (Can.), a 
Crown attorney was prosecuted for paying for sexual services from a minor.  He had met at 
least one of the women he solicited in his capacity as a Crown attorney.  Again, while this 
was not conduct arising in his legal practice, it was a clear abuse of an opportunity provided 
by his practice, and sanctioned as such. Id. at paras. 10, 32. 
 99. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text. 
2780 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
For example, in Law Society of Manitoba v. Dolovich, the Law Society 
justified the disbarment of a lawyer convicted of possessing and distributing 
child pornography on the basis that his disrespect for law would make him 
untrustworthy in the eyes of the public.100
The concern raised by Mr. Dolovich’s convictions of possession 
and distribution of child pornography is not that he is medically or 
psychologically unfit to practice law.  Rather, the concern is that 
neither the public nor Mr. Dolovich’s fellow lawyers can have any 
confidence or trust in him to represent citizens in legal matters or 
to research and explain legal issues when his conduct reveals such 
a profound lack of respect for the laws of this country.
 
101
Other decision makers have similarly suggested that personal misconduct 
can so “shatter . . . [a lawyer’s] professional integrity” that public trust will 
be impossible.
 
102
Yet the concern with public image is not always consistent.  Law Society 
of Upper Canada v. Tassy involved a lawyer who had developed a 
somewhat pathological attitude towards cyclists.
  In effect, these assertions simply restate the argument 
based on professional reputation in different terms. 
103  On three different 
occasions he was convicted of assaulting bicycle riders, which he defended 
as a response to the cyclists’ “discourteous and dangerous” acts.104
As these cases suggest, decision making on personal conduct is as 
inconsistent in Canada as in the United States.  Canadian lawyers can be 
disbarred for conduct far removed from practice, as in Budd or Dolovich, 
but only reprimanded or fined for conduct that is equally serious or more 
closely related to practice, such as violating a court order and committing 
assault,
  The bar 
hearing panel raised the possibility that Tassy might have a mental illness 
and recommended a reprimand if he could provide a psychiatric report 
indicating his fitness to practice law.  He did so and received only that 
sanction.  Although that result does not seem unreasonable, it is hard to 
reconcile with other Law Society rulings.  Decision makers concerned with 
professional reputation might be reluctant to be so lenient with a seemingly 
unstable lawyer who assaulted three cyclists, one of them a child, and 
showed no remorse.  But if, as the result in Tassy suggests, the primary goal 
should be public protection, which is assured by a psychiatric affidavit 
concerning fitness, why is this approach not appropriate in other cases like 
Budd or Dolovich? 
105 threatening someone with a weapon,106 evading taxes,107
 
 100. See Law Soc’y of Man. v. Dolovich, 2010 MBLS 11 (CanLII). 
 lying 
 101. Id. 
 102. Cwinn v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., 108 D.L.R. 3d 381, para. 10 (Can. Ont. Div. 
Ct.). 
 103. Law Soc’y of Upper Can. v. Tassy, [1997] L.S.D.D. No. 46 (Can.). 
 104. Id.  In two cases, he hit them with a walking stick. Id. at para 18.  In another case, he 
shoved a young boy and the boy’s older sister. Id. at para. 28. 
 105. See Law Soc’y of Man. v. Bjornson, [1996] L.S.D.D. No. 258 (Can.). 
 106. See Law Soc’y of B.C. v. Rodgers, [2005] L.S.D.D. No. 125 (Can.). 
 107. See Law Soc’y of Man. v. Ament, [1993] L.S.D.D. No. 150 (Can.). 
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to the police,108 or committing fraud.109  These varying results are partly 
attributable to the broad range of factors that law societies can consider, 
such as remorse, rehabilitation, and prior professional conduct.110
III.  ALTERNATIVE REGULATORY MODELS 
  
Although taking such factors into account may seem reasonable in 
principle, when the practice is coupled with the subjective nature of 
judgments, the concerns about public image, and the lack of empirical 
foundations for predictions about future conduct, the results appear highly 
idiosyncratic.  Such a process is scarcely conducive to inspiring public 
confidence. 
Other countries with legal systems comparable to the United States and 
Canada have moved in a direction of greater responsiveness to consumer 
concerns, and could serve as appropriate models for reform.  These 
countries have established co-regulatory structures in which the bar shares 
authority with other, more publicly accountable entities.  Although 
systematic research will be necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of these 
reforms, their frameworks hold promise for dealing with the structural 
problems that have plagued the United States and Canadian systems. 
A.  Consumer-Oriented Reforms 
Traditionally, barristers and solicitors in England and Wales were 
governed by their own professional societies, which performed both 
representational and regulatory functions.  In 2007, after widespread 
criticism and review, Parliament enacted a new Legal Services Act that 
identifies “protecting and promoting the interests of consumers” as one of 
its key objectives.111  The Act establishes an independent Legal Services 
Board that has responsibility for oversight of legal services in England and 
Wales, with a majority of lay members and a lay chair.  The Board approves 
a frontline regulator for each class of licensed legal providers.  The 
approved regulators retain disciplinary responsibility for complaints that 
allege serious professional misconduct, but must create a largely 
independent body to exercise oversight.112  In addition, the governance 
body of the largest regulator, the Solicitors Regulation Authority, will by 
2013 have a majority of lay members.113  If an approved regulator is too 
slow or ineffective in exercising its authority, the Board may fine the 
regulator, make remedial orders, or withdraw its oversight powers.114
 
 108. See Law Soc’y of N.W.T. v. McCauley, [1993] L.S.D.D. No. 213 (Can.). 
 
 109. See Law Soc’y of Upper Can. v. Reid, [1993] L.S.D.D. No. 27 (Can.). 
 110. See, e.g., Law Soc’y of Man. v. Ament, [1993] L.S.D.D. No. 150 (Can.). 
 111. Legal Services Act of 2007, c. 29, § 1(d) (Eng.). 
 112. Id. § 4.  The approved regulator for solicitors is the Law Society of England and 
Wales, and disciplinary jurisdiction rests with the Solicitors Regulation Authority. 
 113. See LAW SOC’Y GEN. REGS., § 14(6) (2008), http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/
documents/downloads/generalregulations.pdf. 
 114. See Schneyer, supra note 20, at 27. 
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Less serious complaints involving performance issues are addressed by 
the Legal Ombudsman, created by the Office for Legal Complaints, and 
subject to the authority of the Legal Services Board.115  The Ombudsman 
determines an outcome between the lawyer and the client that is “fair and 
reasonable,” taking into account how a court would perceive the 
relationship between the lawyer and client, the applicable rules of conduct, 
and what the “ombudsman considers to have been good practice at the time 
of the act/omission.”116  The Ombudsman may require the lawyer to 
apologize, refund or waive fees, or pay compensation up to £30,000 for 
financial losses or “inconvenience/distress,” and may also take action to put 
right “any specified error, omission or other deficiency.”117
Parties with complaints must first approach lawyers to seek resolution 
within a given period set by a statute of limitations.
 
118  If unsuccessful, they 
may then approach the Ombudsman, who must resolve any grievances in 
accordance with the requirements of procedural fairness, including a 
hearing where appropriate.119  The Legal Ombudsman may dismiss a 
complaint if he or she believes that it has no “reasonable prospect of 
success” or is frivolous or vexatious; if the complainant did not suffer 
“financial loss, distress, inconvenience or other detriment”; if the lawyer 
already offered “fair and reasonable redress”; if the matter would be more 
appropriately dealt with by a court or “there are other compelling reasons 
why it is inappropriate for the issue to be dealt with by the Legal 
Ombudsman.”120  The Legal Ombudsman also has other powers, such as 
the authority to investigate, to advise a client that a related complaint could 
have been brought against another lawyer or law firm, and, if the complaint 
indicates professional misconduct, to advise the regulatory body responsible 
for that lawyer.121  Every time a complaint is made against a lawyer that is 
not resolved in that lawyer’s favor, the lawyer must pay a £400 “case fee” 
in addition to any other sanctions the Legal Ombudsman imposes.122  
England and Wales have also authorized creation of alternative practice 
structures that will allow non-lawyer ownership and will subject the entity 
to regulatory oversight.123
 
 115. See Legal Services Act 2007, c. 29 (Eng.); LEGAL OMBUDSMAN, SCHEME RULES, 
R. 2.1, 2.7, 2.8 (2011).  The Ombudsman’s Scheme Rules are approved by the Legal 
Services Board. 
  This new regime reflects a form of “principles-
 116. LEGAL OMBUDSMAN, supra note 115, at R. 5.37. 
 117. Id. at R. 5.38, 5.40, 5.43, 5.45. 
 118. Id. at R. 4.1, 4.4–4.8, 5.3. 
 119. Id. at R. 5.1–5.35 
 120. Id. at R. 5.7(a)–(c), (m). 
 121. Id. at R. 5.15, 5.19.  The regulatory bodies in England are different for solicitors, 
barristers, and other legal service providers. Id. at R. 1.2, 5.59. 
 122. Id. at Rules 6.3–6.4. 
 123. Press Release, Legal Servs. Bd., LSB Confirms October 2011 as Start Date for 
Alternative Business Structures (Feb. 23, 2010), available at 
http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/news_publications/press_releases/2010/pdf/23022010
_abs_press_release.pdf. 
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based regulation” that focuses on proactively improving performance, not 
simply sanctioning violations after the fact.124
In Australia, widely publicized scandals also prompted state governments 
to create more accountable and consumer-oriented regulatory processes.  In 
2004, a Standing Committee of Attorneys General created Model 
Provisions for the Legal Profession that eventually were translated into 
Legal Profession Acts by all but one state and territory.
 
125  Although the 
Acts vary in certain respects, they share a commitment to increased 
transparency and responsiveness in oversight processes.  For example, in 
New South Wales, an Independent Legal Services Commissioner receives 
all complaints and refers them either to consumer-oriented mediation or to 
the bar’s own regulatory bodies.  Complainants who are unsatisfied with the 
results may seek review by the Commissioner, who has the power to 
substitute a new decision.  The Commissioner also oversees the process for 
handling complaints and may take over a particular investigation or 
recommend more general changes.126  Queensland has an independent 
Legal Services Commission headed by a non-lawyer.127  Its disciplinary 
system includes a Client Relations Center, which resolves minor disputes, 
and a Legal Practice Tribunal, composed of a Supreme Court Justice, one 
non-lawyer, and one practitioner.  Problems of competence and diligence 
can be subjects for discipline, and all disciplinary actions are published on 
the Legal Service Commission website.128
Beginning with landmark 2001 legislation in New South Wales, all but 
one Australian state and territory also allow “incorporated legal practices” 
(ILPs), which permit ownership interests by non-lawyers.
 
129  The 
regulatory framework for these incorporated legal practices serve as models 
for regulatory innovation.  Under this framework, ILPs must have at least 
one practitioner director responsible for creating appropriate management 
systems that ensure compliance with professional conduct rules.130
 
 124. See Andrew Boon, Professionalism Under the Legal Services Act 2007, 17 INT’L J. 
LEGAL PROF. 195, 213 (2010). 
  
 125. See Bobette Wolski, Reform of the Civil Justice System 25 Years Past:  (In)adequate 
Responses from Law Schools and Professional Associations (And How Best to Change the 
Behaviour of Lawyers), 40 COMMON L. WORLD REV. 40, 66–67 (2011). 
 126. See DAVID NICOLSON & JULIAN WEBB, PROFESSIONAL LEGAL ETHICS 86 (1999); 
CHRISTINE PARKER & ADRIAN EVANS, INSIDE LAWYER’S ETHICS 54–55 (2007); Deborah L. 
Rhode, In the Interests of Justice:  A Comparative Perspective on Access to Legal Services 
and Accountability of the Legal Profession, 56 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 93 (2003). 
 127. Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) s 591 (Austl.), available at 
http://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/legisltn/current/l/legalproa07.pdf; Leslie C. Levin, 
Building a Better Lawyer Discipline System:  The Queensland Experience, 9 LEGAL ETHICS 
187, 193–94 (2006); see also PARKER & EVANS, supra note 126, at 56. 
 128. See Levin, supra note 127, at 193; see also PARKER & EVANS, supra note 126, at 56. 
 129. See Christine Parker, Tahlia Gordon, & Steve Mark, Regulating Law Firm Ethics 
Management:  An Empirical Assessment of an Innovation in Regulation of the Legal 
Profession in New South Wales, 37 J. L. & SOC’Y 466, 467 (2010); see also Legal Profession 
Act 2007 (Qld) s 2.7 (Austl.), available at http://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/legisltn/current/
l/legalproa07.pdf; John Briton & Scott McLean, Incorporated Legal Practices:  Dragging 
the Regulation of the Legal Profession into the Modern Era, 11 LEGAL ETHICS 241 (2010). 
 130. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 141 (Austl.). 
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Directors who fail to take “all reasonable steps” available to meet their 
obligations are subject to disciplinary sanctions.131
In New South Wales, which has one of the most well-developed 
oversight structures, ILP management systems must address ten objectives 
relating to matters that often give rise to complaints, such as competence, 
communications, supervision, trust funds, and conflicts of interest.
  Legal Services 
Commissioners also have authority to conduct a compliance audit of 
practice management systems, whether or not a complaint has been filed. 
132  All 
ILPs must conduct a self-audit to assess their compliance with each of these 
objectives.133  ILPs that rate themselves as not fully compliant must work 
with the Office of the Legal Service Commissioner to improve their 
practice management systems.134  In cases where the ILP’s self-audit or 
client complaints raise concerns, the Commissioner can initiate an 
independent audit.135  A comprehensive study of the New South Wales 
framework found that requiring ILPs to go through the process of self 
assessment resulted in frequent internal reforms and reduced the number of 
complaints by about half.136  Part of the success of the system is attributable 
to the constructive non-adversarial working relationship that has developed 
between the Commissioner and the ILPs subject to regulation.137
The same has been true in Queensland, which is now in the process of 
developing external audit processes that will ensure adequate oversight 
without overly intrusive or burdensome requirements.  Among these 
processes are web-based surveys of ILP practitioners and staff concerning 
matters such as ethical culture, billing practices, and complaint management 
systems.
 
138  Results will enable the ILPs to benchmark their performance 
against that of peers, and will help the Commissioner assess the 
effectiveness of different regulatory processes.  Success with this 
framework could lead to adoption for traditional firms as well as those with 
alternative practice structures.139
B.  Non-professional Conduct 
 
Whether the new consumer focus will alter how courts and disciplinary 
agencies treat conduct occurring outside professional relationships is 
unclear.  Traditionally, Australian decisions reflected much the same 
inconsistency apparent in the United States and Canada.  So, for example, 
one 2002 ruling disbarred a practitioner guilty of sexual offenses against a 
minor on the ground that “[t]he public would rightly doubt the standards of 
a profession which permitted a person who has recently committed such 
 
 131. Briton & McLean, supra note 129, at 244. 
 132. See Parker, Gordon, & Mark, supra note 129, at 472. 
 133. Id. at 473. 
 134. Id.  
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 493. 
 137. See id.; see also Briton & McLean, supra note 129, at 248–49. 
 138. See Briton & McLean, supra note 129, at 250–51. 
 139. See id. at 253. 
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serious offenses to remain one of its members.”140  By contrast, a year later, 
another court declined to disbar a lawyer guilty of trafficking in cocaine.141  
Because bar oversight authority comes from the legislature, however, it is 
subject to some democratic accountability, and reputation of the profession 
is now no longer identified as a relevant consideration in imposing 
sanctions.142  The trend of recent decisions is to focus on the seriousness of 
the offense and whether it involves dishonesty.143
One widely reported 2004 New South Wales decision is emblematic of 
the continuing division of views among Australian judges concerning 
non-professional misconduct.  It involved a solicitor convicted of lewd 
conduct toward the children of a woman who later forgave and married 
him.  The solicitor failed to disclose to prospective legal employers those 
convictions and another that had been reversed on appeal.
 
144  Although the 
Court of Appeals ordered disbarment, the Supreme Court emphasized that 
the conduct surrounding the solicitor’s breach of trust was “so remote from 
anything to do with professional practice that the characterisation of the 
appellant’s personal misconduct as professional misconduct was 
erroneous.”145
England and Wales, however, show no signs of departure from their 
traditional approach, which permits sanctions for conduct that could impair 
the profession’s reputation.  The 2007 Solicitors’ Code of Conduct requires 
practitioners to avoid any conduct “within or outside [their] professional 
practice which undermines [public] trust.”
  Because the solicitor had already lost his license for five 
years while the case was pending, the court believed that no further sanction 
was appropriate. 
146  The Code of Conduct for 
barristers similarly requires that they not engage in conduct likely to 
“diminish public confidence in the legal profession or the administration of 
justice or otherwise bring the profession into disrepute.”147  To some 
tribunals, a criminal conviction seems almost by definition to justify 
striking a practitioner from the roles in order to “maintain the reputation of 
the profession” and “sustain the public confidence.”148
 
 140. Law Soc’y of S. Austl. v Rodda [2002] SASC 274 ¶ 29 (Austl.) 
  In cases involving 
matters such as drugs, sex, or driving while intoxicated, disbarment is 
ordered without any discussion of the nexus between personal and 
professional misconduct; the decision simply lists the offenses and declares 
 141. Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of N.S.W. v P [2003] NSWCA 320 (Austl.).  For 
other cases, see Duncan Webb, Nefarious Conduct and the ‘Fit and Proper Person Test,’ in 
ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON LAWYERS AND LEGAL ETHICS:  REIMAGINING THE 
PROFESSION, supra note 97, at 218–40. 
 142. See id. at 222. 
 143. See id. 
 144. A Solicitor v Council of the Law Soc’y of N.S.W. [2004] HCA 1 (Austl.). 
 145. Id. ¶ 34; see also Webb, supra note 141, at 224. 
 146. SOLICITORS REGULATION AUTH., SOLICITORS’ CODE OF CONDUCT 2007, R. 1.06 
(2007). 
 147. CODE OF CONDUCT OF THE BAR OF ENGLAND AND WALES ¶ 301(a)(iii) (8th ed. 2004). 
 148. Law Soc’y v. Gilbert, [2000] All E.R. (d) 1891 (Eng.).  Although that case involved 
professional misconduct, the court’s decision to increase the sanction following a criminal 
conviction is reflective of the priority placed on professional reputation. 
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them “discreditable” and likely to “bring the profession into disrepute.”149
IV.  AN AGENDA FOR REFORM 
  
Unlike recent regulatory reforms concerning professional misconduct, the 
focus in non-professional discipline seems to be on public image, not public 
protection. 
To what extent the United States and Canada might follow England and 
Australia’s lead in consumer-oriented reforms is by no means clear.  As Ted 
Schneyer notes, the changes in those countries were largely attributable to 
powerful consumer groups with government allies, including antitrust 
regulators.150  In the United States and Canada, as discussed earlier, such 
pressures are largely absent.  American antitrust law has not generally been 
invoked to challenge state court rules, and the inherent powers doctrine 
limits legislative intervention on bar regulatory matters.151  American 
courts have, however, tolerated legislative and administrative regulation 
that they consider consistent with their authority.152
In Canada, no structural barriers prevent reform along the lines adopted 
in Australia and in England and Wales.  Although the lack of public 
  Some courts might be 
willing to implement reforms along the lines that England and Australia 
have pioneered, if structured in ways that did not challenge the judiciary’s 
ultimate authority.  To the extent that the Australian model of regulating 
ILP demonstrates success in reducing complaints through a cooperative, 
problem solving, rather than adversarial, approach, some bar associations 
might be willing to adopt similar frameworks.  Greater transparency in 
decisions concerning non-professional misconduct might also persuade bar 
associations and courts to adopt standards promoting greater consistency. 
 
 149. CODE OF CONDUCT OF THE BAR OF ENGLAND AND WALES ¶ 301(a)(i), (a)(iii); see BAR 
STANDARDS BD., DISCIPLINARY FINDINGS:  SIMON AUSTIN HAMILTON (2009), 
http://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/complaints-and-professional-conduct/disciplinary-
tribunals-and-findings/disciplinary-findings/?DisciplineID=74852 (child pornography, 
public indecency); BAR STANDARDS BD., DISCIPLINARY FINDINGS:  NICOLA JANE MARSHALL 
(2008), http://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/complaints-and-professional-conduct/
disciplinary-tribunals-and-findings/disciplinary-findings/?DisciplineID=74836 (driving 
while intoxicated, failure to stop after accident); BAR STANDARDS BD., DISCIPLINARY 
FINDINGS:  AMIR HASSAN MODJIRI (2007), http://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/complaints-
and-professional-conduct/disciplinary-tribunals-and-findings/disciplinary-findings/
?DisciplineID=74803 (cocaine possession); BAR STANDARDS BD., DISCIPLINARY FINDINGS:  
RUPERT JOHN MASSEY (2006), http://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/complaints-and-
professional-conduct/disciplinary-tribunals-and-findings/disciplinary-findings/
?DisciplineID=74742 (indecent assault on a male); BAR STANDARDS BD., DISCIPLINARY 
FINDINGS:  JOHN PAUL TEMPLE (2006), http://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/complaints-
and-professional-conduct/disciplinary-tribunals-and-findings/disciplinary-findings/
?DisciplineID=74757 (child pornography). 
 150. Schneyer, supra note 20, at 24. 
 151. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 789 & n.18 (1975); see also supra notes 
11–16, 42–45 and accompanying text.  For infrequent antitrust action, see Terry, supra note 
42, at 200–02. 
 152. See Eli Wald, Should Judges Regulate Lawyers?, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 149, 156 
(2010); Charles Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulation:  The Role of the Inherent 
Powers Doctrine, 12 U. ARK. L.J. 1, 6–13 (1989).  For the U.S. Supreme Court’s willingness 
to tolerate congressional regulation, see Barton, supra note 12, at 1211–12. 
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concern about the weaknesses in lawyer regulation may inhibit fundamental 
changes, some incremental progress may be possible through shifts in law 
society practice or through legislative amendments to the authorizing 
statutes under which those law societies operate. 
A.  Proposals for the United States 
A more effective disciplinary process in the United States would expand 
its oversight and remedial approaches concerning professional performance, 
and narrow its concern with non-professional offenses.  The jurisdiction of 
disciplinary agencies should be broadened to include neglect, negligence, 
and fees, and resources should be increased to ensure adequate investigation 
and remedial responses.  Rather than relying almost exclusively on client 
complaints (supplemented by felony convictions), regulatory officials 
should initiate investigations based on judicial sanctions and self-audits.  
More effort should be made to insulate regulatory agencies from 
professional pressures and to develop cost-effective dispute resolution 
processes for minor misconduct.  A co-regulatory structure along the lines 
developed for Australia, England, and Wales could include a lay 
ombudsman with responsibility to mediate disputes, review dismissed 
cases, and make periodic reports to the courts concerning the performance 
of the regulatory process.  Lawyers should be required to carry malpractice 
insurance and remedies should include client compensation.  Support 
services and diversion programs for lawyers with mental health, substance 
abuse, office management, and short-term financial difficulties should help 
these practitioners establish an appropriate remedial plan and supervise 
their compliance.153
The process also needs to become more transparent.  Lawyers should be 
required to provide information to clients or to centralized databanks 
concerning their disciplinary and malpractice records.
  More efforts should also be made to track the 
effectiveness of these programs and to deal with recidivists. 
154  Four-fifths of 
surveyed Americans express a desire for such resources, and replicable 
models involving physicians are widely available.155  Disciplinary 
complaints should also be made public if the relevant oversight body finds 
probable cause for investigation.  Although lawyers have generally opposed 
this proposal on the ground that disclosure of unfounded complaints would 
unjustly prejudice their reputations, no evidence has demonstrated those 
harms in the minority of states with open processes.  If civil complaints and 
police arrests are matters of public record, it is not clear why grievances 
against lawyers should be subject to special protection.156
 
 153. See ABEL, supra note 
  Because 
consumer surveys find deep suspicion about closed door proceedings, even 
5, at 512–14; RHODE, supra note 6, at 163–64; Diane M. Ellis, 
A Decade of Diversion:  Empirical Evidence that Alternative Discipline Is Working for 
Arizona Lawyers, 52 EMORY L.J. 1221 (2003). 
 154. See ABEL, supra note 5, at 514; RHODE, supra note 6, at 162–63. 
 155. See Steven K. Berenson, Is It Time for Lawyer Profiles?, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 645, 
651–57, 680 (2001).  For these and other reforms, see RHODE, supra note 6, at 162–65. 
 156. See Levin, supra note 34, at 21–22. 
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the ABA’s own disciplinary commission has recommended disclosure of 
non-frivolous complaints.157
Concerns of public protection should also figure more prominently in the 
review of non-professional misconduct.  Given the difficulties of predicting 
future offenses from unrelated past misconduct, the most empirically 
defensible approach would be to limit bar oversight to matters involving 
fraud, dishonesty, and other acts relevant to professional work.
 
158
B.  Proposals for Canada 
  If that 
limitation is politically implausible, another possibility would be to 
establish guidelines for the treatment of specified offenses, modeled on 
standards applicable in other licensing contexts subject to legislative 
oversight.  At the very least, the profession should strive for more 
consistent treatment of similar conduct, and should avoid duplicating 
criminal sanctions for largely reputational objectives. 
To achieve a truly efficient and effective regulatory system in Canada 
will require structural changes.159  Although it is unrealistic to expect that 
oversight could be moved from the provinces to the federal government, it 
does seem possible to reduce the autonomy of the law societies and their 
dependence on volunteers.160
Tribunal members could be paid and appointed by a joint committee of 
the chief justices of the provincial court of appeal and trial courts, and the 
elected and lay benchers of the law society.  This appointment process 
should be designed to ensure some diversity in members’ backgrounds and 
some professional independence and public accountability for their 
performance.  Most complaints involving client services could be brought 
directly by the aggrieved party, although the law society should have the 
option of intervening in a case where it believes appropriate. 
  While investigation and prosecution 
functions could remain within the law societies, a separate tribunal should 
be established to adjudicate disciplinary cases.  That tribunal could also 
mediate lawyer-client disputes, much as the Legal Ombudsman does in 
England and Wales.  Oversight should be expanded to address performance 
concerns that fall short of professional misconduct, and to provide remedies 
for clients. 
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aspects of its rules of courts or real estate laws. 
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Under such a system, law societies would retain their power to set 
standards of conduct, to screen and investigate complaints, and to determine 
whether matters brought to their attention should proceed to the disciplinary 
tribunal.  While most competence cases would be brought to the dispute 
resolution tribunal directly by the complainant, law societies would also 
have standing to bring issues related to lawyer performance. 
Following the model of England and Wales, each province should also 
create a distinct legal regulatory review office.  Such an office should 
review the decisions of the law societies and recommend modifications or 
reconsideration.  At least one province, British Columbia, already has an 
Ombudsman who has jurisdiction over a wide range of consumer 
concerns.161
In addition to these structural changes, the substance of lawyer regulation 
in Canada also requires revision and expansion.  In particular, law societies 
should focus greater attention on common consumer grievances and 
remedies, especially in relation to excessive fees and gaps in malpractice 
insurance coverage.
  Like that Ombudsman, the position proposed here would not 
have the power to direct the law society to reach a specific conclusion on 
matters of policy or in specific cases.  Its mandate would be to provide a 
voice for consumer and other interests that are not sufficiently reflected in 
law society decision making. 
162  Law societies should emphasize standard-setting 
and other proactive oversight activities, rather than simply responding to 
specific instances of serious professional misconduct.163
With respect to non-professional behavior, the statutory power of the law 
societies to regulate in the interests of the profession should be abolished 
and the focus should be on public protection, not public image.  Sanctions 
should be reserved for conduct that may undermine the lawyer’s ability to 
practice, such as substance abuse, or that suggest dishonesty or willful 
violation of court orders.  Bar disciplinary processes should not be used to 
duplicate the criminal justice system; their role should be narrowly directed 
to protection of clients and the justice system. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The problems of lawyer regulation in the United States and Canada are 
significant, systemic, and structural.  But they are not inevitable.  Recent 
reforms in England, Wales, and Australia lay the foundations for an 
oversight framework that is more responsive to public interests.  Whether 
these changes will achieve their full potential remains to be seen.  At the 
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very least, however, these reforms promote greater transparency and 
accountability, and create the potential for ongoing revision in light of 
experience.  The United States and Canada could benefit from comparable 
strategies. 
One value of colloquia like this one is that their international focus 
invites more searching scrutiny of insular national practices that ill serve 
societal needs.  For centuries, the American and Canadian bars have 
asserted that self-regulation is critical in maintaining the profession’s 
“independence from government domination.”164
 
  International 
comparisons suggest that such independence can be maintained through 
co-regulatory structures that also provide greater checks on professional 
self-interest and greater responsiveness to consumer concerns.  The 
challenge remaining for the United States and Canada is to build on these 
insights from abroad to inspire national reforms that are long overdue. 
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